Geopolitics & Economic Statecraft

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On this episode of Cowen’s Thematic Outlook Podcast Series, focusing on emerging growth and disruptive innovation, Geopolitical Security & Defense Policy Analyst for Cowen Washington Research Group, Roman Schweizer, joins host and Head of Thematic Content Bill Bird. Their discussion focuses on what market observers may underappreciate about the current geopolitical setup, what it may take to end the Russia/Ukraine war, plausible scenarios for how China/Taiwan/U.S. tensions may develop, and the implications of heated geopolitical tensions for defense spending.

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Transcript

Roman Schweizer:

But I think the world is not going to go back to the globally integrated economic structure that most investors have grown comfortable with.

Bill Bird:

Hello and welcome to the Thematic Outlook Podcast Series, part of Cowen Insights Podcast. My name is Bill Bird, Cowen head of thematic content, and today we have a special guest from Cowen Washington Research Group, Roman Schweizer. Today’s topic is geopolitics, which may prove to be one of the most disruptive and influential themes in coming years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the largest most aggressive military mobilization since World War II. Meanwhile, in Asia, China is ratcheting up pressure on Taiwan in a potential land grab with very far-reaching consequences.

Bill Bird:

Our guests today is Roman Schweizer, who covers geopolitical security and defense policy for Cowen Washington Research Group. Prior to his career in policy research, Roman worked as an acquisition professional in US Navy ship building. He has also worked as a consultant of Fortune 100 companies on US and international defense, aerospace, homeland security, and technology market sectors. Roman, we’re honored to have you on the show this month. Thanks for joining us.

Roman Schweizer:

It’s great to be here.

Bill Bird:

Roman, there’s so much to talk about and cover in geopolitics. Let’s start at a very high level. What, if anything, do you believe investors may under-appreciate about the current geopolitical setup?

Roman Schweizer:

That is the big one, I think. And, really, to me, it’s the pace and permanence of the change that, really, the global security and economic system is in the midst of right now and will go through over the next several years. I mean, it’s trite to say that the world is uncertain and the world is getting more dangerous. I hear that from national security officials all the time, and that’s always been the case, but it’s tough to define the era that you’re living in when you’re in the middle of it. We had this cold war and that dawned on people, the post Cold War world and then 9/11 and post 9/11, and I don’t know what we’re into now, an era of geopolitical competition. China and Russia emerged as competitors to the US.

Roman Schweizer:

But I think the world is not going to go back to the globally integrated economic structure that most investors have grown comfortable with over, really, since the 90s, so call it 30 years or so. There are shifts underway that will have far reaching and permanent effects. US and China technology decoupling is one example. Obviously, the European and Russia energy decoupling is another. And over the last 20 or 30 years, this global economic structure integration has really been based on certain alliance frameworks, security guarantees, and general rules of the road, and those have all been … I mean, I hate to say it, it was blown apart, either by the US/China, I loosely used the term decoupling, and certainly Russia’s aggressive behavior in Europe. Those are all changing.

Roman Schweizer:

I had to go back into the files, but the first note I published with Cowen, I used the term, “new world disorder,” and really, I regret how accurate that’s been. But I think that that is really going to be simply more of a feature than above in this new alignment structure. You’re going to see a lot of these changing alliances, and those are going to have economic impacts as well.

Bill Bird:

Roman, how do you see the US balancing its two biggest current foreign policy challenges with Russia and China?

Roman Schweizer:

That’s a tough one, even in the best case. And I really think if you read a lot of works, and there’s certainly a book, Thucydides Trap by Graham Allison, this idea of a rising power and established powers and things like that. And the challenge that China presents to the United States from a sheer economic perspective is something that the US has never faced before. But now if you lump of a willing Russia into that mix, a loosely based unending or friendship alliance between the two, it’s really challenging.

Roman Schweizer:

Now, that’s not to say that the US doesn’t have its own allies and freedom loving democracies around the world in Europe and Asia as well, and I think that’s what we’re starting to see. But from a US government perspective, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was not expected and really hasn’t been helpful. At least in Washington, where I am, it’s been viewed as a distraction in some ways and siphoning resources that really would be applied to the long-term threat, China, which is really … And again, as I referenced, what is considered by many is a more formidable challenger, both from an economic technology and a military supremacy perspective.

Roman Schweizer:

So Russia has forced the US to divide its attention and resources and hopefully head off or blunt a major war in Europe that … I mean, really, when we think about it, there is a general fear that unchecked Russian aggression could spread into the Baltics, into some of the former Soviet Union territories and things like that. And so there’s a lot of concern now that once the genie is out of the bottle, that this really could become a wider European conflagration.

Roman Schweizer:

The thing that I would say, and I don’t this is all that controversial, and I hate to describe it as a positive byproduct because, obviously, the magnitude of death and human suffering and destruction in Ukraine, nothing is positive at all about that, so I just want to preface that. But a byproduct has been, at least, it’s forced the Europeans to pick a side. And you see that certainly within the broader EU, within the NATO alliance, and again, just think of the idea that Finland and Sweden are on the cusp of becoming official members of NATO. Now, that hopefully will happen, assuming Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, doesn’t use his veto, which is something that’s, again, showing how complicated the world is.

Roman Schweizer:

But the Europeans haven’t been able to straddle. And particularly for the Germans, this is a tough call, given the economic or really energy dependence, the decisions that Germany made 20 years ago in terms of its view on engagement with Russia. So the Europeans have come along, begrudgingly, in some cases, and are trying to not completely tank or demolish their economies by supporting tough export controls and sanctions. I think, really, the key question that many in the West and Russia and China are looking to see is whether or not European voters are going to punish, or whether they’re willing to bear the economic and societal burdens of the current sanction’s regime, the energy crunch, the inflation, the recession that Western Europe is faced with.

Roman Schweizer:

You can see that on the difference in how the alliance is dealing with this. I mean, certainly, the Germans and the French and the Italians are concerned about the economic impacts of what some of these broader sanctions and export controls and policies may have, whereas the countries that are in the direct line of March of the Russians, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Georgia, some others, could care less about the economics and they want the Ukraine to win. They want a tough fight.

Roman Schweizer:

Boris Johnson did not have a no confidence vote, largely because of his support on Ukraine, but I think, obviously, French President, Emmanuel Macron, and certainly German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, have to be sensitive to the economic pain that German and French citizens are being asked to bear to stand up to the Russians, and we’ll see how that plays out. And of course, Vladimir Putin and Xi in China do not have to worry about free and open elections in their political future.

Bill Bird:

Roman, let’s unpack some more of your thoughts on the Ukraine war. What will it take for Putin to end it? What does victory look like for the US, and what’s your base case for the duration of the war?

Roman Schweizer:

Wow. I would say I have been pretty consistent, I think, in taking the longer term, I would say the “over” to use the one metaphor, but I mean, certainly most of the conventional wisdom was that Ukraine was going to fold within the first 48 to 72 hours. Obviously, that didn’t happen for a lot of reasons, and mainly the bravery of the Ukrainian defense forces. Putin was not able to kill or decapitate Ukrainian leadership. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is still alive and has become … I think most people would’ve not had him as being a 21st century Winston Churchill, but he has managed to do that and rally support around the world. And so I don’t think Putin ends the war unless he wins.

Roman Schweizer:

Now, wins can be defined in different ways, and certainly I think he thought this might have been easier than it has been, for sure. I think he probably misjudged some of the European and US reaction as well. But I think he has the wherewithal to continue to grind this out. And really, the unfortunate truth is that the US and EU can’t really bring to bear the real crushing economic sanctions on export controls, on energy without crushing themselves. And also, look, Russia still has friends, key countries, and obviously the Chinese are providing non-overt support to the degree they can, and China has a long-term interest in Putin’s survival.

Roman Schweizer:

But even countries like India and Turkey, which are either buying energy, stepped up their energy purchases from Russia, or trade and other materials, those countries are playing both sides. Nothing is analogous, exactly, to the Cold War, but back in the day you had NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and a huge nonaligned movement, and you can see the world devolving, unfortunately, into those things. A US-led alliance of like-minded democracies, a China/Russian-led alliance of international ne’er do wells, like North Korea, like Iran, and like some others. And then countries that are going to be nonaligned and believe it’s in their best interests, in a lot of cases, to straddle the fence and play both sides. Even an ally like the Philippines, you see that in Asia, or a traditional US ally like the Philippines.

Roman Schweizer:

What’s the base case for a duration of the war? I believe this clearly goes into next year. I think just at least in the near term, the Ukrainians are on the offensive. That could have shockingly good results or could just really soak up a lot of your Ukrainian precious resources in terms of manpower and material. So we’ll see. Offense is a lot harder than defense, which the Russians well know, over the last almost more than six months.

Roman Schweizer:

So I really think we’re going to get to, by the time it really gets cold and winter and call it maybe November, certainly December, both sides are going to hunker down, and I think whether or not we’ll see an official cease fire, we’ll see some sort of pause while both sides look to refit and re-arm and recuperate, and then probably something starts up again next year, either maybe during the tail-end of the winter freeze or after the winter fall. But I would agree. I mean, I tend to think that this is just a continuation of a campaign that Putin started in 2014, and he’s not going to stop until he gets all of Ukraine.

Bill Bird:

Roman, turning to US-China tensions, how do you see the situation with Taiwan playing out, and what are some of the more plausible scenarios?

Roman Schweizer:

Yeah, that’s a great question and certainly one that gets asked a lot. And I think the only man who really knows the answer to that is Xi Jinping. I mean, this is clearly his decision and his internal calculus, and really, it is anyone’s guess as to what’s in his mind. I would say, I mean, I think if you’re handicapping this, and there’s obviously a lot of chatter about this, that looking at Putin and the Ukraine and do autocrats get the real talk, #realtalk from their generals about what the capability of their own military is and what the capabilities of the opposing force is? Do they get the answer that they want, or do they get the truth? Is the Chinese military really as ready as the Russians? Is it better? I think those are all big questions that he needs to consider, and I think the view is that he gets one chance at this, right? And if it’s something quick, fait accompli, almost, that the rest of the world has to just begrudgingly accept for other economic and technological reasons, leverage over the West, then he’ll call that shot when he’s ready, when he believes.

Roman Schweizer:

I think from a military perspective, there’s a view that China won’t have the right amount of military force and technology and training and all the complex things that go into it until the 2025 to 2027 timeframe. That’s this period called the Davidson Window for defense nerds. Basically, it’s named after the former head of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson. And that’s when he assessed that the Chinese would have the right level of manpower, material, training, all of this stuff practiced together to really … I mean, look, this is a hard problem for the Chinese military. I mean, Taiwan is 100 to 110 miles away. I think Normandy was maybe 13 miles across the English Channel. So, I mean, you’re really talking about something the equivalent of D-Day 10 times the distance with all eyes in the world on satellite imagery and really not a lot of ability to disguise what you’re doing.

Roman Schweizer:

So I’m certainly not in a position to disagree with Admiral Davidson when he calls 2025 to 2027. I think really, now, it’s a race between the US’ ability to, one, shift forces and develop technologies to combat this potential challenge in Taiwan and elsewhere where China has either territorial claims or otherwise, and Taiwan’s ability to really focus and improve its military. Really, along the line, I think Ukraine will have some lessons learned in terms of active defenses and things like that. So there’s really some things that the US and Taiwan could do in short order to make it even a harder nut to crack, really create a hedgehog-type defense.

Roman Schweizer:

And then really, the Chinese, what they decide to do in terms of strategy and reaction. I mean, I would say that the initial Chinese response after House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit, what is by some called The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, showed that the Chinese military, it is a much different military than the one from the last crisis. So 1996, 1997. They have an ability to project power, to launch anti-ship missiles at range, to coordinate aircraft operations on the eastern side of Taiwan, to do a lot of different things than they’ve shown previously. But still, this is a varsity level exercise to pull off an operation like that, and they’ve shown an ability to partially blockade or isolate Taiwan. That would be a much different strategy and require a much different diplomatic approach.

Roman Schweizer:

I think, to me, the most plausible scenario, at least for the next several years, is a concerted effort to beef up Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and then, really, something that started on the Trump administration, but an alliance building effort between the US, Japan, Australia, and India, loosely. We’re not loosely, actually formally known as The Quad, as well as others in the region to preserve the status quo, but maybe push that Davidson Window further out into the future. And so that tipping point moment or window just keeps getting pushed out as the Taiwanese develop capability, and it’s a back and forth like that.

Bill Bird:

Roman, as we look at elevated geopolitical tensions, and also what we’re learning from recent strategies on the ground in the Ukraine, what do you believe are the implications for US defense spending?

Roman Schweizer:

Look, I mean, it’s a pretty simple answer. Spending is going up. And interestingly, I mean, the thing I think people may not realize, but I mean, spending went up a lot during the first two years of the Trump administration and then really moderated in the final two years. Right now, US defense spending looks like it’s going to be about 800 billion for fiscal year 23. Congress is debating that right now. But there’s real discussion that defense spending could go as high as a trillion dollars over the next several years. So again, that’s not next year. Maybe the year after. Maybe the year. Maybe fiscal 25, or probably 26. And there is a real question as to whether or not once you start to put a T, and uppercase T next to that spending number, is there a ceiling there that politicians will be unwilling to broach that trillion dollar level? So we’ll have to see what happens when we get there, but obviously what goes on in the world makes a hell of a difference.

Roman Schweizer:

And the one thing I would say is that when you look at the history of US defense spending, it is largely correlated to geopolitical events, to changes in the geopolitical structure. And you see that surge and reduction at the peak at World War II, at the peak of Korea, at the peak of the Cold War, at the ramp into, really, the peak of the global war on terrorism, I guess, we’d say, in Iraq and Afghanistan peaking around 2008, coming down around 2010. And really, I think we’re in the front end of a new ramp. One of the jokes in town is that defense spending doesn’t stay flat forever. I think it stayed flat for the last, I think, 2013, ’14 and ’15, and then it’s been a pretty steady climb. So, I mean, you go through these fits and spurts, and I think we’re really in one of those moments right now.

Roman Schweizer:

But the other thing that I think it’s important that people recognize, particularly investors, but spending in the European Union and NATO is surging. I mean, I think European defense spending bottomed, actually, in 2014, again, to go back to Putin and Crimea. And then, lo and behold, you start a war on the European continent and the Europeans get a little more serious about defense. You get into this next phase, an even bigger war breaking conventions and norms about states going to war with each other, and you start to see that surge again. I think most of those NATO countries are going to surge to that two percent of GDP standard that many have been reluctant to do, and some of them are going up to three percent, and I think it’s obviously the countries that have a closer proximity to Russia are more apt to do that.

Roman Schweizer:

But the other thing, Asia, there is a genuine arms race in Asia. Japan is considering doubling its defense spending. Australia has been spending and has a number of ambitious acquisition programs, and obviously, the AUKUS agreement that the Three Nation, or trilateral agreement to share between the US, UK, and Australia to share nuclear technology shows the level of commitment there. And then, of course, and then the Middle East continues to be a robust spending environment as the GCC looks to counter Iran. So again, I think that the global defense spending, not just US spending, but global defense spending is going higher, and I think not enough folks realize that.

Bill Bird:

Roman, let’s shift gears to how geopolitics is impacting business policy. A few weeks back, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, 52 billion flows towards domestic semis, among other things. What are the important implications of the bill? Who stands to benefit? And also, where might we see other legislative action like this?

Roman Schweizer:

Yeah, great question. And really, I think one of the things, again, when you pull back and just think about it, this is the US government consciously deciding that it needs to be engaged in an industrial … or help shape and fund industrial policy to make the US competitive with China. China, which, again, I don’t think it’s controversial or unknown, the state that they subsidize a large number of state-owned entities and drive our research and development spending into key technologies and subsidize a lot of companies of all sizes. And this is really the US government acknowledging that that exists, that there needs to be countered. Now, of course, there is a fear that whenever the US government gets involved in picking winners and losers that it doesn’t turn out well.

Roman Schweizer:

But having said that, this is really, I think, the first phase of what could be a broader push to shape and to help subsidize or advantage industries, loosely dubbed technologies of the future. But really, the US government has created a list called critical and emerging technologies. It’s a list of technologies created by the US government, created by this White House, but also that appears in other places. And I would just say, I mean, I’m just going to rattle off some areas, but it’s computing, manufacturing, network sensing, nuclear energy, biotechnology, communications and networking, human-machine interfaces, network sensors, quantum, renewable. I’d even throw in their financial technologies. I don’t know what the competition there is going to be.

Roman Schweizer:

And really, look, this is to counter China’s made in 2025 of list in which they said this list of areas are areas that they want to dominate, that they believe will be critical technologies and markets in the 21st century, and that they want to set the bar. And again, this is automated machine tools and robotics, aerospace, rail, new energy, agriculture, biopharma and medical tools and things like that. So when you look at the CHIPS Act, this is, to me, the first battle, or maybe the first shot in that fight. Semi, I think it’s been realized that semis are the bullets in the 21st century technology war that are going to drive artificial intelligence, quantum, everything else, smart devices, everything. They really are an enabling technology.

Roman Schweizer:

Honestly, I think just to frame it out, another example is right now we’re in the early phases of one on biotech. I think there’s a government panel that’s looking at biotech. So that could be the next area after semis that the government looks at as an area targeted for either subsidies or industrial policy or things like that, that help shape that.

Roman Schweizer:

Now, the one thing I would say, as you mentioned, what companies are going to benefit or what areas and things like that, we’re still in the wait-and-see mode. The commerce department is going to manage the CHIPS Act implementation. They’re not used to running a program of that size or that magnitude, and there are some political aspects about this. I mean, there’s that companies that receive CHIPS Act money can’t do business in China, that none of the funds can be used for share buybacks and things like that. There might be conditions related to workforce or labor. So, I mean, it’s going to be challenging. It’ll be interesting to see how this is implemented and really whether you get the net effect, the kickstart that I think a lot of folks are hoping that this does and whether this becomes a model for other areas.

Roman Schweizer:

And then certainly, while there is also a focus on CHIPS, the other thing I would just mention, CHIPS and Science Act, Senator Chuck Schumer, senate majority leader who is really one of the driving forces behind this, he had a bill called Endless Frontiers, which would increase the … So when you hear people talk about a 300 billion bill, CHIPS and Science Act, the 52 billion is an emergency appropriation. So that’s real cash that goes right into the commerce department’s bank account to spend and start to doll out in the form of grants and things like that. But the other money is really increased authorizations that then you need the annual appropriations to be matched with that.

Roman Schweizer:

But that is going to be implemented through a special department in the National Science Foundation, and then as well through the Department of Energy. And so I think that’s the secondary piece of that to see, “Okay, well, what of those other technologies, the things that we’ve been talking about, whether it’s robotic or AI or quantum or those other things, how those programs and projects are going to be rolled out. So again, not a lot of details on this. This is a live issue that’s unfolding us as we speak. But again, I think, to me, the biggest issue is that US government has understood or understands now that it needs to shape and pay for an industrial policy to help counter what China has been doing.

Bill Bird:

Roman, what are some of the policy initiatives that you’re watching in the near term that you think investors will want to pay attention to?

Roman Schweizer:

Yeah, look, I think the biggest disruption or inflection point is going to be the midterm elections, and I think that because a change in the balance of power in Congress can have such a big impact on the level of defense spending, some of our foreign policy, what weapons packages get approved for nations, what legislation gets passed and signed into law. And so I think there’s a couple of things. As we’re recording this right now, I think that the view is that the House will flip to Republican control with maybe perhaps a much tighter or narrower margin than it would’ve otherwise or just a few weeks ago, and that the Senate could stay in Democratic hands and perhaps maybe even grow to a genuine majority, maybe 51 seats or something like that. Obviously, the Senate is 50/50 right now with the tiebreaker vote being cast by the Vice President.

Roman Schweizer:

From a policy perspective, I think November is going to really reset some of these assumptions. Certainly, defense spending, I think, is an area that’s going to continue to grow regardless of the outcome. But I think China is probably really one of the ones that you could have the biggest impact. There are some provisions and some things that were dropped out of the CHIPS and Science Act on investment screening, outbound investment screening, which a lot of companies and industries in the US have opposed or that would basically create a review structure to approve or disapprove any capital investment or joint ventures with China. There’s some trade provisions in there as well, and then there’s even the Taiwan Policy Act, which would be very inflammatory with the Chinese.

Roman Schweizer:

But the House Republicans created a China task force several years ago. They produced a report in 2020. It had, I think, something like 80 recommendations. We included some information on that in our last Ahead Of The Curve report on China that House Republicans really plan to push pretty hard on China and shaping China policy as well as, I mean, look, Republicans have been looking for or clamoring for COVID origin hearings for a year. Probably going to get some pretty stern stuff that the China task force recommended. So that’s what I really look for is I don’t see how US/China relations, I mean, I don’t see a path for them to get better. If anything, there’s going to be probably more catalyst, more friction after the midterms.

Roman Schweizer:

And then lastly, from a defense policy side, I mean, I think there is a pretty interesting debate as to what the war in Ukraine is teaching us in terms of how modern militaries fight each other. I mean, again, not to belabor this or get too much into the weeds, but for the last 20 years, since 9/11, the US military has not really fought a regular military. I mean, I’m going to discount the Iraqi military at the beginning of the war there, but it’s been counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, coin warfare, not fighting a peer military.

Roman Schweizer:

And so we’re seeing that for the first time with Russia, Ukraine, the destruction of hundreds, really thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, the use of artillery, the advancement, the various applications of drones for reconnaissance, for lethal, the sinking of a major warship, the Moskva, in the Black Sea, in terms of shore-launched anti-ship missiles and things like that.

Roman Schweizer:

And so I think, certainly in this town, Washington, there’s a cottage industry of people who are going to study what works and what works under any circumstance and what works particularly in this circumstance. And so I think that debate will go on, and we’ll see how the individual service branches, the Navy, the Army, the Air Force take lessons and really change their shift dollars, shift their procurement, and it obviously has an impact on companies. I also think there’s a munition cycle that I think people, one, the usage rate of precision and even imprecise just artillery is amazing. I mean, I think more so than many war planners had presumed. And you’re going to see that if this war goes on. And so I do think we’re going to see a pretty significant up-cycle in munition stockpiling, in inventory build, both in the US, in NATO, and even with a Taiwan or Australia or Japan.

Roman Schweizer:

And I think there’s also just this broader issue. And again, certainly not to make light of the Russians and Ukrainians who are dying on the battlefield. This is certainly not a video game, not a fight on social media or something to be taken lightly. But I mean, really, you have the Russian military, which I think would have been viewed as the second best military in the world prior to this, not being able to invade its neighbor.

Roman Schweizer:

And, I mean, maybe an equivalent analogy would be the US trying to invade Mexico or Canada and not being able to pull it off, whereas you look at what the US has been able to do in terms of projecting power, not 113 miles like Taiwan is from China, but thousands of miles into the mountains of Afghanistan or into the Persian Gulf or into Africa, hunting the various terrorist offshoots there. And so you really do realize how credible and capable the US military is. And so I think as people think about, “Well, okay, what is China really building its military to be able to do? What are the Russians really capable of, the Iranians, North Koreans?” I think we will get a broader defense debate about concepts of operations and what kind of technologies are right for the modern battlefield.

Bill Bird:

Roman, a final question before we finish up. What are some upcoming Cowen events related to policy that are worth highlighting?

Roman Schweizer:

We’re continuing our China call series, our Ukraine call series with experts both on the economic technology and really defense aspects of that. So I would encourage listeners to pay attention for those announcements. We’re trying to keep up a pretty regular cadence on that. In two months, the Cowen Washington Research Group will do our post midterm election conference. It’ll be virtual this year, so folks will be able to tune into that, and we’ll have of an instant reaction from folks from both parties, and then we’ll be able to dive down into … We’ll do some panels and speakers in terms of all of the areas, thematic areas that the Washington Research Group covers, whether that’s tax and trade, financial services, crypto, cannabis, healthcare, TMT, geopolitics, security and defense. And I think that’ll be a good marker for folks to really start thinking about how the next two years are going to look in Washington in the run-up to the presidential.

Roman Schweizer:

And then last thing, I’ll pitch that we do our annual aerospace and defense conference in February, normally in early February, and we’re going to be changing that this year. We’re going to be bumping it back. It’s going to be more mid-February, but big spoiler alert, we’re moving from New York to Washington, and we’re going to be able to have a much more heavy policy focus on that. And certainly, most of the companies are headquartered here now. So we expect that to be a very positive event in terms of moving the conference. So for folks out there, please stay tuned. In terms of our call series, we try to bring a wide group of folks with insights into both China and certainly Europe and Ukraine, and do that on a regular basis.

Bill Bird:

As we wrap up today’s podcast, I want to thank Roman for sharing his insights and our listeners for taking time out to tune in. Be well and take care until next month.


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